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N AVIATION LITIGATION, where the suit is litigated is as
important as the facts of the case. An aviation lawsuit often
starts far from the crash site, and the early stages are almost al-
ways devoted to motion practice over jurisdiction and venue.
This article addresses some of the more commonly occurring
jurisdiction and venue issues that arise in aviation cases, from
the perspective of both the plaintiff and the defendant. It also
addresses recent legal developments that have a substantial ef-
fect on where aviation lawsuits finally land.
First, this article will describe the considerations that plain-
tiffs' attorneys should take into account when choosing where to
bring suit, including identifying proper venues, determining
whether each potential venue can support jurisdiction over the
defendants, determining the availability of federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, and considering how the choice of law rules of
the chosen forum will impact the applicable law. Second, this
article will discuss the tools that defendants can utilize to obtain
a more favorable forum, including challenging personal juris-
diction, removal to federal court, transfer of venue, and dismis-
sal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This article will
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address recent major changes in the law that affect each of these
options, including recent critical decisions relating to personal
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, forum selection clauses,
and forum non conveniens.
II. THE PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE
A. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL VENUES
The first question an aviation plaintiff must answer is: where
can the lawsuit be filed? Under federal law, venue is appropriate
in a district where "any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located," or where
"a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred."' Although venue statutes may vary from state to
state, they generally conform with the principles of the federal
statute, and most focus on two critical factors: (1) where the de-
fendants reside; and (2) where the operative facts of the case
occurred.2
A diligent plaintiffs attorney should cast a wide net and look
at all of the facts that could possibly support venue, identifying
all of the states that may have a connection with the crash, and
determine whether each state constitutes a proper venue. Avia-
tion cases usually have links to numerous venues,3 giving plain-
tiffs a variety of choices. The obvious place to start is the location
of the crash. In many cases, this is the most convenient forum,
where evidence and eyewitnesses are located.4 In cases involving
helicopters or smaller aircraft with limited ranges, crashes often
I See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). "Resides" for purposes of this statute is where the
corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
2 James L. Baudino, Venue Issues Against Negligent Carriers-International and Do-
mestic Travel: The Plaintiffs Choice?, 62 J. AIR L. & CoM. 163, 199 (1996) (noting
that "most [state venue] provisions mirror the language of the federal statutes
regarding defendant residency or domicile and locations where a substantial por-
tion of events took place giving rise to the cause of action," although the provi-
sions may "vary extensively" in other respects).
3 E.g., Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 321 (D.N.J. 1989) (con-
cerning a plane manufactured in Kansas, sold to subsidiaries in Indiana and New
York, transported through Florida and eventually sold to a buyer in New Jersey.
Component parts may have originated from Kansas, Delaware or Virginia. The
plane took off in New Jersey and crashed in Rhode Island.).
4 See, e.g., Houck v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 373, 376 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (describing "the availability of evidence ... [and] witnesses who observed
the accident," proximity of "post-occurrence witnesses," and proximity of "partici-
pants in the recovery operations and the wreckage itself' as important factors
recommending the transfer of venue to the state where the plane crashed).
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take place during intrastate flights, and the victims or their survi-
vors frequently live in the state where the crash took place.5
The location of the crash, however, will not always provide a
plaintiff with a satisfactory forum.6 In such cases, the plaintiff
may consider other potential venues, including the locations of
the manufacturers of the aircraft and its component parts, the
locations where the aircraft was based, flown, and maintained,
and the locations where the victims and their survivors reside.7
This last option is particularly attractive because "it is commonly
recognized that trial courts in a plaintiff's home state provide
the plaintiff with the most sympathetic recourse for justice."'
However, aviation cases are particularly unique in terms of
venue because they often involve flights that cross over state or
national boundaries.9 In cases involving longer flights, aircrafts
sometimes "fortuitously" crash in states that would otherwise
have no connection to the case, giving a plaintiff a unique venue
option.'
5 See Trump Taj Mahal Assocs. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta,
761 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (D.NJ. 1991) (involving a helicopter crash in NewJersey,
a New Jersey-based helicopter operator, and New Jersey-affiliated victims of the
crash).
6 Indeed, plaintiffs often attempt to bring suit in plaintiff-friendly forums far
from the location of the crash. This is especially true for foreign plaintiffs seeking
to take advantage of the perceived advantages of American law. See Austen L.
Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien De-
fendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 44-45 (2006) (listing reasons for the per-
ceived advantages of filing suit in the United States).
7 See Beach v. United Airlines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 807, 809 (C.D. Ill. 2002)
(holding that a national airline carrier and its subsidiary that made frequent
flights in and out of Springfield, Illinois could reasonably expect to be sued there
and that venue was therefore proper in the Central District of Illinois); Am. Air-
craft Sales Int'l, Inc. v. Airwarsaw, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1351-53 (M.D. Fla.
1999) (holding that balance of convenience strongly favored transfer of dispute
over purchase of airplane from Florida, where buyer resided, to Indiana, where
seller and majority of witnesses resided, the plane was located, and almost all
documentation relating to the plane was present); Melliere v. Luhr Bros., 706
N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ill. App. 1999) (holding that venue was appropriate in a particular
county of Illinois because defendant leased an airplane hanger there). Counsel
should pay close attention to the history of the aircraft, including maintenance
records. These documents could reveal a variety of potential venue options.
8 Nicholas D. Welly, The Misleading Legacy of Tseng: Removal Jurisdiction Under
the Montreal Convention, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 407, 413 (2010).
9 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 1984) (involv-
ing the crash of a plane that departed from the Bahamas, was bound for Florida,
and crashed in international waters).
10 While the location of the crash will generally support venue as the place of
the injury or where the harm was caused, whether the location of a crash is "for-
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If a plaintiff selects a forum other than where the crash site is
located, especially one with a tenuous connection to the facts,
counsel must be prepared to fight a battle over venue." Counsel
should gather documentary evidence of acts or omissions that
took place in the venue, such as maintenance records, witness
statements, documents available from the public accident
docket published by the National Transportation Safety Board,
or sworn testimony that confirms the location of potentially cul-
pable parties and acts. While jurisdictional discovery can some-
times be used, venue decisions are often made before the
parties have any opportunity to take substantive discovery.1 2
Plaintiffs must be prepared to make arguments supporting their
chosen venue early in the case and should have their venue evi-
dence marshaled and authenticated before filing suit.
B. SECURING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
It is not enough for a plaintiff to choose a proper venue. To
effectively litigate against all potentially culpable parties in a sin-
gle case, the state where the suit is filed must have either general
or specific personal jurisdiction over all of the defendants."3 In
aviation cases, determining this can be a daunting task. The
facts in air crash cases, by their nature, often spread across mul-
tiple jurisdictions, complicating a plaintiff's efforts to prove per-
sonal jurisdiction. For example, the component part
manufacturer or maintenance company whose part failed or
whose maintenance was defective may have had little or no busi-
ness in the state where the aircraft crashed. 4 Or an aircraft may
tuitous" or not often has a key impact on choice of law. See infra Section II.C and
note 104.
'1 See, e.g., Houck v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 373, 376 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (holding that the availability of witnesses, the proximity of the material
event, and "public interest in having the case resolved near the forum where the
tragedy occurred" all work in favor of transferring forum to the state where the
plane crash took place).
12 See infra note 46.
13 Sher v.Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that 'jurisdic-
tion over each defendant must be established individually.").
14 See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, No. C 11-03194, 2012 WL 1380247, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2012) (personal jurisdiction found to be lacking over French
component part manufacturer that had no independent business dealings in Cal-
ifornia); Agape Flights, Inc. v. Covington Aircraft Engines, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 2d
1278, 1286 (E.D. Okla. 2011); Williamson v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 31 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 551 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (third party claim brought against manufac-
turer of component part that allegedly failed and caused crash off Texas coast
but had no regular business in Texas).
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have been negligently maintained by a local shop far from the
location of a crash without any knowledge that the aircraft
would be flying over or operating out of the plaintiffs chosen
forum. 15 Or an aircraft could have only ended up in a forum as
a result of third parties selling or transporting the aircraft with
no involvement of the manufacturer and no specific intent by
the manufacturer to conduct business in that state.16 As dis-
cussed below, the Supreme Court's recent decisions have cut
back on plaintiffs' ability to secure personal jurisdiction. 7 Re-
gardless of the fact pattern, plaintiffs' attorneys must carefully
consider whether their chosen forum will provoke a jurisdic-
tional fight, and if so, whether that fight can be won.
1. Daimler and the Decline of General Personal Jurisdiction
When a party is subject to general personal jurisdiction in a
state, it can be sued there for any act, regardless of the nature of
its connection to the actual forum.18 The Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions have substantially diminished a state's ability to
exercise general personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defen-
dant.19 General personal jurisdiction could traditionally be exer-
cised over a party when it had "continuous and systematic"
contacts in the forum state. 20 For decades, general personal ju-
risdiction was a frequent tool of plaintiffs' attorneys in multi-
15 See Raffile v. Exec. Aircraft Maint., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268-75 (D.N.M.
2011) (holding that the company that maintained aircraft in Arizona was not
subject to personal jurisdiction in a case brought where the aircraft crashed in
New Mexico); Heckel v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 467 F. Supp. 278, 284 (W.D. Pa.
1979) (holding that "it is unfair for a small repair shop which has no contacts
with the forum state to be subject to [the] court's jurisdiction"); Miller v. Cousins
Props., Inc., 378 F. Supp. 711, 717 (D. Vt. 1974).
16 See D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroffv. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94,
103-04 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the manufacturer of an aircraft that ended
up in Pennsylvania as a result of third-party resales was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania); accord Bunch v. Lancair Int'l, Inc., 202 P.3d 784,
794 (Mont. 2009).
17 Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 303-04 (2014) (noting the trend of proce-
dural developments in the past quarter century of "narrowing both specific and
general personal jurisdiction").
18 For this reason, general personal jurisdiction is often referred to as "all-pur-
pose jurisdiction." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 752 (2014); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
19 Miller, supra note 17, at 303-04.
20 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)).
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defendant aviation cases.2' Plaintiffs could allege, and later
prove by jurisdictional discovery, that manufacturers had years'
worth of consistent and systematic sales in a given state, and this
was often sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction. 22
In the 1984 decision Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, the Supreme Court began to recognize the limits of gen-
eral personal jurisdiction.23 Helicopteros involved a wrongful
death action brought in Texas against a Colombian helicopter
transportation company that arose out of a helicopter crash in
Peru.24 The defendant had sent its chief executive officer to
Texas for a contract negotiation session; accepted checks drawn
from a Texas bank; purchased helicopters, equipment, and
training services from a Texas helicopter manufacturer; and
sent personnel to Texas for training.25 Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court held that these contacts were insufficient to estab-
lish general personal jurisdiction. 26
In recent years, the Supreme Court has become even more
hesitant to authorize the exercise of general personal jurisdic-
tion.27 In a 2011 opinion, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown,28 the Court rejected the exercise of general personal ju-
risdiction by North Carolina over a foreign tire manufacturer
based solely upon the distribution of tires into the stream of
commerce that ultimately ended up in the forum state. 29 Good-
year stressed the level of connections necessary that would need
to be present for a court to exercise general personal jurisdic-
tion, holding that defendants' connections must be extensive
21 See, e.g., Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 319-324 (D.NJ.
1989) (holding that a NewJersey court could exercise general personal jurisdic-
tion over a Kansas corporation because the corporation had made enough sales
and employee visits to New Jersey to create "continuous and systematic" contacts
with the state).
22 E.g., Grimes v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1262-63 (W.D.
Okla. 2010).
23 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
24 Id. at 409-10.
25 Id. at 416.
26 Id. at 417-18.
27 Miller, supra note 17, at 303-04.
28 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
29 Id. at 2856-57. Stream of commerce arguments are similarly unavailing
when a manufacturer targets a specific region; rather, the target must be the state
in question. See Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest Int'l, Ltd., 385 F.3d
1291, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting "[a] general hope that a party will use a
product in a general region is too remote an aspiration to qualify as purposeful
availment in a specific state").
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enough to "render them essentially at home in the forum
State. 3 °
When it was published, the impact of Goodyear was less than
clear; one commentator suggested hopefully that the Court's
use of "essentially at home" was 'just a figure of speech that does
not raise the bar for general jurisdiction." '3 That opinion was
proven wrong in 2014, however, when the Supreme Court is-
sued its decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman. 2 In Daimler, the
plaintiffs, victims of state-sponsored kidnapping, detainment,
torture, and murder in Argentina, filed suit in California against
Daimler AG, which the plaintiffs alleged had a subsidiary that
collaborated with the Argentine government.3 3 Daimler had a
separate subsidiary in the United States with multiple California-
based facilities.3 1 Sales from that subsidiary accounted for 2.4%
of Daimler's worldwide sales. 5 The district court found that
general jurisdiction over Daimler was lacking, but the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed on panel rehearing, and a subsequent en banc peti-
tion was denied over an eightjudge dissent.3 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Ninth Circuit.3 In addition to finding that Daimler's subsidi-
ary's contacts could not be imputed to Daimler for purposes of
general personal jurisdiction,38 the Court held that even if they
could be imputed, those contacts would not be sufficient to sub-
ject Daimler to personal jurisdiction in California.3 9 Building
upon Goodyear's holding that "only a limited set of affiliations
with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose
30 Id. at 2851. On the same day, in a plurality opinion issued in J McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), the Supreme Court rejected the
exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of a prod-
uct that ended up in New Jersey when there was no specific targeting of the New
Jersey market by the manufacturer, holding that " [t] he defendant's transmission
of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be
said to have targeted the forum." Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. While this decision
addressed specific jurisdiction and not general jurisdiction, it is consistent with
the Supreme Court's general trend that led to Daimler's substantial limitation on
the exercise of general jurisdiction. See Miller, supra note 17.
31 Symeon C. Symeonides. Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2011: Twenty-
Fifth Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 298 (2012).
32 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
33 Id. at 750-51.
34 Id. at 752.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 752-53.
37 Id. at 753, 763.
38 Id. at 759.
39 Id. at 760.
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jurisdiction there," Daimler essentially limited the exercise of
general jurisdiction over a corporation to only its principal place
of business and state of incorporation.4 ° In a footnote, the Court
stated that it did not "foreclose the possibility that in an excep-
tional case.. . a corporation's operations in a forum other than
its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business
may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the cor-
poration at home in that State. '41 However, the limiting lan-
guage of the decision clearly indicates that such exercises of
personal jurisdiction will be rare in post-Daimler practice.
Daimler's significance cannot be understated. Plaintiffs' Oppor-
tunities to secure general jurisdiction over a company in any fo-
rum where it has done business have taken a major blow.4 2 It is
no longer enough that a corporation does business in a state; as
one commentator observed, "doing business jurisdiction is a
dead letter."43 The decision essentially forecloses a plaintiffs
ability to rely upon a defendant's various places of business,
products swept into the stream-of-commerce, or level of sales to
establish general personal jurisdiction.44
As a result of Daimler, plaintiffs counsel must significantly al-
ter his or her approach to personal jurisdiction. As an initial
matter, if a plaintiff wants to rely upon general personal jurisdic-
tion, the plaintiff should be prepared to engage in jurisdictional
discovery tailored to Daimler's requirements.4 5 Prior to filing a
lawsuit, a plaintiff rarely knows the extent of a company's opera-
tions in any given state. If the first pleading a plaintiff sees is a
- Id.
41 Id. at 761 n.19 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952)).
42 See David D. Siegel, Note, U.S. Supreme Court Severely Circumscribes "Presence" as
Basis for Personal Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations-Claim Itself Must Have Local
Roots; If It Hasn't, Corporation's Overall Contacts with State Won't Support Jurisdiction,
265 SIEGEL'S PRAc. REv. 1 (2014) (concluding that "[t]he opportunities for per-
sonal jurisdiction of foreign corporations are of course much reduced after
Daimler. . .").
43 TanyaJ. Monestier, Where is Home Depot "At Home"? Daimler v. Bauman and
the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 265 (2014).
44 See Kate Bonacorsi, Note, Not at Home with "At-Home"Jurisdiction, 37 FoRHAM
INT'L L.J. 1821, 1853 (2014) ("General jurisdiction, the sole door to relief for US
plaintiffs when the minimum contacts approach was otherwise too narrow, is now
officially closed.").
45 See Monestier, supra note 43, at 282-83 (agreeing with Justice Sotomayor
that the "likely effect" of Daimler "is to increase jurisdictional discovery"). But see
Jamin S. Soderstrom, The Shrinking Scope of Jurisdictional Discovey: What the
Bauman Decision Really Means, 78 TEX. B.J. 20, 21 (2015) (opining that Daimler
limits the relevant topics for jurisdictional discovery).
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challenge to personal jurisdiction, then a plaintiff should-and
usually has the right to-explore the validity of the defendant's
allegations regarding a court's lack of personal jurisdiction
through discovery.46 Notably, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Daimler alluded to the fact that consideration can be given to the
strength of a defendant's contacts with one state compared to
others. 47 Unless the plaintiff's preferred jurisdiction is the de-
fendant's state of incorporation or principal place of business,
the plaintiffs time and expense may be better spent establishing
specific jurisdiction.
2. Establishing Specific Jurisdiction
As aviation cases often involve defendants sued in locations
far from where they would be considered "essentially at home"
under Goodyear and Daimler, a plaintiff will be far more likely to
succeed in establishing specific, rather than general, personal
jurisdiction.4" Unlike general personal jurisdiction, specific per-
sonal jurisdiction does not focus on a party's broader connec-
tions to a state; rather, it focuses on whether the cause of action
arises out of or relates to actions that the defendant purpose-
fully directed toward the forum state.49 Thus, a manufacturer
that specifically targets a given state with its products would be
subject to specific personal jurisdiction in that state if its prod-
ucts caused an injury in that state. 50 Beyond that inquiry, a court
may not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant "under circum-
stances that would offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
46 See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 456 (3d Cir. 2003)
(holding that "the plaintiffs right to conduct jurisdictional discovery should be
sustained" so long as the plaintiff presents factual allegations that suggest "with
reasonable particularity" the existence of contacts sufficient to sustain jurisdic-
tion); Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 729-31 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a plaintiff has a qualified right to obtain jurisdictional discovery
prior to dismissal). But see United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610,
625-26 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that the entitlement to jurisdictional discovery is
"not absolute" and within the court's discretion); Sunview Condominium Ass'n v.
Flexel Int'l, Ltd., 116 F.3d 962, 964 (1st Cir. 1997) (same).
47 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014) ("General juris-
diction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety,
nationwide and worldwide.").
48 See id. at 761; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2851 (2011).
49 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
50 E.g., Grimes v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1261-62 (W.D.
Okla. 2010).
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substantial justice."'-51 Furthermore, plaintiffs should be mindful
of the requirements of a state's long-arm statute, which may in-
volve a separate inquiry from the traditional federal analysis.5 2
In a recent unanimous decision, Walden v. Fiore,5" the Su-
preme Court clarified certain aspects of the specific jurisdiction
inquiry.54 Interpreting prior case law, the Court emphasized that
the defendant's relationship with the forum state must arise out
of connections that the defendant itself, not any other party, has
with the forum state. 55 A plaintiffs connections with the forum
state, no matter how significant they are, cannot be "decisive" in
determining whether a defendant is subject to specific jurisdic-
tion in that state.56 Walden also emphasized that the "minimum
contacts" analysis "looks to the defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who
reside there. '57 Thus, the emphasis is on more than the defen-
dant's relationship with the plaintiff; it is distinctly focused on
the defendant's connection to, and intended affiliation with, the
forum state.58
Walden highlights the unique issues facing aviation plaintiffs
who are pursuing manufacturers and maintenance companies.59
Aircraft are used all over the globe, and manufacturers often do
not target specific states as markets.6 ° Furthermore, aircraft, by
their very nature, traverse state lines. 61 It has long been the law
that specific jurisdiction cannot arise from a contact with a state
based solely upon "the unilateral activity of the plaintiff" or an-
51 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cali., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 113
(1987) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
52 E.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Aerohawk Aviation, Inc., 259
F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1102 (D. Idaho 2003) (conducting analysis under Idaho long-
arm statute relating to crash in Idaho before engaging in analysis as to personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause). It should be noted, however, that
although a state's long-arm jurisdiction can be more limited than federal due
process allows, it cannot be more expansive. Bryant v. Salvi, 141 Fed. App'x 279,
282 (5th Cir. 2005).
53 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
54 See Air Tropiques, Sprl v. N. & W. Ins. Co., No. H-13-1438, 2014 WL
1323046, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) (characterizing Walden as a "rearticu-
lat[ion]" of the standards for specific jurisdiction).
55 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122.
56 Id. (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
57 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122.
58 Id. at 1122-23.
59 See id. at 1115.
60 E.g., Raffile v. Exec. Aircraft Maint., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1269 (2011);
Heckel v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 467 F. Supp. 278, 284. (W. D. Pa. 1979).
61 Heckel, 467 F. Supp. at 284.
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other party.6 2 Unfortunately, for aviation plaintiffs, pilots and
distributors often take products far from where they were origi-
nally shipped, without any knowledge or control by the original
manufacturer or seller.63 Crashes thus frequently take place in a
forum that a defendant never specifically targeted.64 Addition-
ally, maintenance companies may perform work on an aircraft
during a stop-over in one state, with no knowledge as to where
that aircraft is based or may be flown, much less where it may
crash.6" A court may conclude that a state would have specific
jurisdiction under the applicable principles or long-arm statute
because the injury occured within the state's borders, but if the
defendant never had any purposeful contact with that state, the
court may still find that the exercise of jurisdiction "would not
comport with fair play and substantial justice."66 As Walden
stressed, it is the defendant's relationship with the state that
matters, not necessarily with any particular individual in that
state.
6 7
This aspect of jurisdiction can create a conundrum for avia-
tion plaintiffs because a state where an aircraft crashed, which
may be a convenient forum, may not have the power to adjudi-
cate a claim against a key defendant.68 This is especially trouble-
some when the plaintiffs primary jurisdiction theory is based
upon the defendant's placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, a common fact pattern in aviation cases.69 In Asahi
62 Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980)); accord
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
63 See, e.g., Raffile, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
64 See Bearry, 818 F.2d at 375-76 (finding no personal jurisdiction over aircraft
manufacturer when all of company's transactions were completed outside of the
forum state and it had no office, agents, or control over dealers in forum state).
65 E.g., Raffile, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1268-75; Heckel, 467 F. Supp. at 284.
66 Bunch v. Lancair Int'l, Inc., 202 P.3d 784, 795 (Mont. 2009).
67 Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122-23 (2014). At least one commentator
was concerned about this language, stating that "[t]aken out of context, this sen-
tence might seem to announce a rule that dealings with forum-state plaintiffs
could never suffice and that the minimum contacts test requires some additional
connection to the forum state." Patrick J. Borchers, The Twilight of the Minimum
Contacts Test, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REv. 1, 8 (2014). However, Professor Borchers
noted that such an interpretation would conflict with previous Supreme Court
decisions sustaining personal jurisdiction based solely upon a contract with the
defendant in the forum state. Id. at 8-9.
68 Raffile, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1268; Mayo v. Tillman Aero, Inc., 640 So. 2d 314,
320 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
69 E.g., Bunch, 202 P. 3d at 794-95, 800; Bearry, 818 F. 2d at 372.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County,70 a
plurality of the Court opined that simply "plac [ing] ... a prod-
uct into the stream of commerce, without more," is insufficient
to subject a party to personal jurisdiction in a given state.7' Ac-
cordingly, to justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction, plaintiffs
often have to rely upon activities that show a defendant's intent
to serve the market in the forum state, such as a defendant's
shipping of products or sales in the state, designing products for
that state's market, advertising in the state, establishing channels
for customers in the state, or marketing the products through a
distributor in the state.72 However, "a defendant's awareness
that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into
the forum state does not convert the mere act of placing the
product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward
the forum State. '78 This statement seems uncannily geared to-
ward aviation cases, as such products cross state lines by the very
nature of their use. 4
In 2011, the Supreme Court revisited the "stream of com-
merce" theory in its divided decision, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
v. Nicastro.75 In Nicastro, the plaintiff injured his hand while us-ing a metal-shearing machine manufactured by the defendant,
an English company.76 The injury occurred in NewJersey, where
the plaintiff filed suit.77 The manufacturer sold its products
throughout the United States through an independent distribu-
tor, but did not specifically target New Jersey.78 The plurality
opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, emphasized that, as to
specific jurisdiction, "[t] he question is whether a defendant has
followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy
existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the
sovereign has power to subject the defendant to judgment con-
cerning that conduct. ' 79 The plurality opinion found that an in-
tent to serve the U.S. market, without more, could not subject a
70 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
71 Id. at 112.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See Heckel v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 467 F. Supp. 278, 284 (W.D. Pa. 1979)(noting that aircraft are "fully . . . intended to fly everywhere at great speeds
crossing state lines at will").
75 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
76 Id. at 2786.
77 Id.
78 Id.
- Id. at 2789.
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defendant to specific personal jurisdiction in NewJersey; rather,
the plaintiff needed to show that the defendant "purposefully
availed itself of the New Jersey market."8 In concurrence, Jus-
tice Breyer attempted to limit the holding to the specific facts of
the case and criticized the plurality's failure to take a nuanced
look at modern distribution practices.8 "
As the Court could not reach a five-Justice majority, Nicastro
provides very little clarity regarding the law of specific personal
jurisdiction. 2 However, it is clear that the location of a crash,
without more, is no guarantee of personal jurisdiction."' Plain-
tiff's counsel should be mindful of a company's activities, adver-
tisements, sales, and distribution practices in the chosen forum,
and should be prepared to engage in jurisdictional discovery to
determine if a defendant has undertaken sufficient activities to
target the forum state.8 4 Obtaining specific jurisdiction in a fo-
rum distant from the location of a defendant is more likely than
securing general jurisdiction after Daimler,"5 but as Nicastro illus-
trates, it can still be a challenge.8 6
3. The Risk of Picking and Choosing Targets
Ordinarily, plaintiffs counsel in an aviation case can identify
a primary target defendant, and choose a forum that has per-
sonal jurisdiction over that defendant. For example, if the plain-
tiff's theory is centered on the failure of a component part, the
manufacturer's home state may be a choice forum, even though
the crash took place in a different forum thousands of miles
away. 7 There are risks to doing so, however, especially if the
chosen forum is clearly not the most convenient under the facts
of the case as a whole.88 This is especially true when there are
80 Id. at 2790.
81 Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 2780 (majority opinion).
83 See id.; D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d
94, 106 (3d Cir. 2009).
84 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987).
85 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757-58 (2014).
86 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790.
87 See, e.g., Complaint at 4-5, 24-26, Allison v. Boeing Co., 2012 WL 2055104
(N.D. Ill. June 7, 2012) (No. 12CV04511) (Plaintiff filed suit against defendant
manufacturer of component parts in defendant's principle place of business of
Chicago, Illinois, even though the crash occurred in Nigeria).
88 See, e.g., Bunch v. Lair Int'l, Inc., 202 P.3d 784, 790, 795 (Mont. 2009) (find-
ing that the manufacturer of a component part of an airplane could not be sub-
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other potentially culpable parties beyond the jurisdictional
reach of the forum state. Choosing a forum without regard to
potential jurisdiction over critical non-parties could open the
door to dismissal on other grounds.
For example, in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,89 the plaintiff, a rep-
resentative of the estates of individuals who perished in a plane
crash in Scotland, chose to file suit in the United States and
joined only the manufacturers of the aircraft and propeller.9 0
The plaintiff did not seek to join the Scottish owner and opera-
tor of the aircraft, despite significant evidence of their responsi-
bility for the crash." In affirming the district court's dismissal
under forum non conveniens, the Supreme Court emphasized
the fact that the defendants would not have the opportunity to
implead the Scottish parties in the forum state, although they
were "crucial to the presentation of [the defendants'] defense,"
but they would be able to do so in Scotland. 92 This argument has
been successfully employed by defendants in other foreign crash
cases to obtain forum non conveniens dismissal.9"
The lesson from Reyno is that plaintiffs counsel in an aviation
case should consider the fact that a failure to choose a forum
with personal jurisdiction over all potentially viable defendants
could result in involuntary dismissal. 94 Of course, in some cases
jected to personal jurisdiction in the state where the crash occurred because the
dispute could be resolved more efficiently in a different forum).
89 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
90 Id. at 239-40. The plaintiff actually originally filed suit in a California state
court, which was removed to federal court and transferred to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 240-41.
91 Id. at 239-40.
92 Id. at 259.
93 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Over Makassar Strait, Sulawesi, No. 09-CV-
3805, 2011 WL 91037, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2011) (holding that "the fact that
Defendants can implead Adam Air in Indonesia but not here weighs in favor of
that forum"); In re Air Crash Near Peixoto De Azeveda, Brazil, on September 29,
2006, 574 F. Supp. 2d 272, 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd sub nom. Lleras v. Excelaire
Servs. Inc., 354 Fed. App'x 585, 587 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the "difference
in [personal] jurisdiction over potentially liable parties" in Brazil as opposed to
New York "weighs strongly in favor of dismissal"); Gambra v. Int'l Lease Fin.
Corp., 377 F. Supp. 2d 810, 824 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (inability to join potential third
party defendant favored dismissal in favor of France); Nolan v. Boeing Co., 762 F.
Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd 919 F.2d 1058, 1069 (5th Cir. 1990) (defend-
ants' defense of negligence by British non-parties that could not be impleaded in
Louisiana weighed in favor of forum non conveniens dismissal). The same argu-
ment could be used to support a transfer to a forum that does have personal
jurisdiction over all potentially culpable parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
94 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
2015] AFTER THE CRASH, WHERE DO YOU LAMD?
the alternative forum is so undesirable that the risk of picking a
forum lacking jurisdiction over all potential parties is worth tak-
ing, and in other cases there simply will be no forum where
every potential party would be subject to personal jurisdiction.
While there may not be one right answer-and in some cases,
no right answer-plaintiff's counsel must nevertheless be keenly
aware of the personal jurisdiction issues that will arise regardless
of which forum is ultimately chosen. 5
C. CHOICE OF LAw CONSIDERATIONS
Even choosing what appears to be the best forum does not
guarantee the application of the most favorable law.96 The most
overlooked consideration in choosing a forum is how that
choice will affect the substantive law that will govern the case.9"
Aviation cases typically involve facts and parties that span the
country or even the globe. 98 No matter where a case is filed,
facts will likely exist to support the application of other states'
laws.99 Thus, as one commentator put it, "knowledgeable coun-
sel, before filing suit, can survey the choice of law rules of the
states in which service can be effected, and sue in the state
whose choice of law rules are likely to result in application of the
substantive law most favorable to her client's cause." 100
Analyzing what law might apply under the potential forum's
choice of law rules should be a critical consideration before the
decision is finalized.10 1 Savvy litigators should immediately aban-
don two common presumptions. First, picking what appears to
be the friendliest forum is no guarantee that its law will apply. 102
Second, the site of a crash, particularly in cases involving flights
95 Anthony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REv. 167, 178
(2000).
96 See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp.,
203 Fed. App'x 604, 606-07 (9th Cir. 2008).
97 See Harry Litman, Considerations of Choice of Law in the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens, 74 CAL. L. REv. 565, 591-92 (1986).
98 James A.R. Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation
Rules and the Common Law, 54 LA. L. REv. 1001, 1005 (1994); see Reyno, 454 U.S. at
235.
99 Nafziger, supra note 98; see, e.g., Reno Flying Servs., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft,
Inc., No. 13-cv-04346 NC, 2014 WL 6629531, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014).
100 Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice
of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. LJ. 1, 10 (1991).
101 George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't A Conserva-
tive Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649, 674 (1993).
102 See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp.,
203 Fed. App'x 604, 606-07 (9th Cir. 2008).
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across multiple states, is not guaranteed to provide the applica-
ble law.1"3 In fact, in air crash cases, courts have increasingly
adopted the view that the location of an air crash in a transna-
tional flight is considered "fortuitous" and should have a limited
impact, if any, on choice of law. 104
Thus, in addition to identifying the most friendly forum,
plaintiffs counsel must also identify which substantive law will
be the most favorable, and whether the chosen forum's choice
of law rules will likely result in the application of that law.'0 5 This
can be a complicated process, as choice of law rules vary from
state to state." °6 Many states follow the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, which promotes a factor-based test that com-
pares each state's connections with the case to determine which
state has the "most significant relationship" to the case or spe-
cific issue.' 0 7 Other states focus on a "governmental interest"
test, which weighs the competing interests that each state has in
applying its laws.' Certain states have their own unique ap-
proaches: Pennsylvania, for example, has a self-described "hy-
brid" choice of law system that incorporates the Restatement
approach, a governmental interest analysis, and the more tradi-
tional but largely discarded lex loci delicti doctrine. 09
103 See, e.g., Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1983) (ap-
plying Colorado law to crash in West Virginia); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
203 A.2d 796, 798, 806-07 (Pa. 1964) (explicitly abandoning the doctrine of lex
loci delicti, or applying the law of the place of the wrong, in favor of a "flexible"
approach, and applying Pennsylvania damages law to Colorado airplane crash).
104 Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1978) (noting
that "in airplane crash cases, the place of the wrong, if it can even be ascertained,
is most often fortuitous"); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 222 A.2d 897, 900 (Pa. 1966)
(site of crash in Georgia during flight from Florida to Pennsylvania had no im-
pact on choice of law because it was "wholly fortuitous"); see Nafziger, supra note
98 (noting that "the rule or presumption of lex loci delicti is routinely discredited
in air disaster cases because of the 'fortuity' of accidents"); see also In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 615 (7th Cir. 1981)
("That the injury in our case occurred in Illinois can only be described as fortui-
tous. Had the DC-10's engine fallen off later, the injury might have occurred in
one of any number of states.").
105 See Brown, supra note 101, at 674. ("The plaintiffs shopping will consist
generally of a twofold search for a jurisdiction with a favorable substantive law
and a choice of law theory that will point to the application of that law.").
106 Ryan, supra note 95, at 191.
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 6, 145; see Torrington Co.
v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex. 2000); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Tex. 1984).
108 See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp., 263
Fed. App'x 604, 605-06 (9th Cir. 2008).
-o See Garcia v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., 421 F.3d 216, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2005).
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Determining the likely applicable law is often more important
than establishing that the venue meets the necessary procedural
and jurisdictional requirements.' 10 A change of venue is not
necessarily fatal, but failing to consider the impact of choice of
law at the outset can be."' In one recent case, Reno Flying Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft, Inc., the plaintiff, the owner of an air-
craft damaged while landing in California, sued in California
the Florida manufacturer of the component part that allegedly
failed.11 2 California law and Florida law, however, were drasti-
cally different in terms of the application of the economic loss
doctrine." 3 Under California law, whether a component part's
damaging of the larger product should be barred by the eco-
nomic loss doctrine is typically a question for the finder of
fact. 4 By contrast, Florida law bars tort claims as a matter of law
when a component part damaged the larger product under its
version of the economic loss doctrine.1 15 On summary judg-
ment, the district court held that, despite the occurrence of the
crash in California, Florida law should apply under California
choice of law rules, and under Florida law, the plaintiffs' tort
claims were barred." 6 The plaintiff could have avoided this re-
sult by choosing a forum whose choice of law rules were more
likely to result in the application of California law." 7 As Reno
Flying Services illustrates, determining which substantive law is
likely to apply is a critical consideration in choosing the
forum.' 8
110 Reno Flying Servs., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04346 NC, 2014 WL
6629531, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014).
-1l See, e.g., id. at *5.
112 Id. at *1.
113 Id. at *2-4.
114 See, e.g.,Jimenez v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 450, 483-85 (Cal. 2002); KB Home v.
Super. Ct., 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 596 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2003), as modified on denial
of reh'g (Nov. 19, 2003).
115 See, e.g., Turbomeca, S.A. v. French Aircraft Agency, Inc., 913 So. 2d 714,
717 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 2005); Am. Universal Ins. Grp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 578
So. 2d 451, 452-53 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 1991).
116 Reno Flying Servs., 2014 WL 6629531, at *2-5.
117 In fact, an unpublished but closely analogous Ninth Circuit decision had
reached an identical conclusion in a similar air crash case. The California court
in Reno Flying Services relied heavily on that persuasive non-binding decision. See
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp., 263 Fed.
App'x 604, 606-07 (9th Cir. 2008).
118 See Reno Flying Servs., 2014 WL 6629531, at *2-5.
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D. THE FEDERAL OPTION
Once a plaintiff settles on a state in which to file suit, he or
she must then decide whether to bring the case in federal court
or state court.1 1 9 If federal court is the chosen route, the plain-
tiff must ensure that all of the prerequisites for federal jurisdic-
tion are met.' 20 Alternatively, a plaintiff may be committed to
bringing suit in state court, and must then take precautions to
keep the case there. 121
1. Prerequisites of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they can only
hear cases over which they have original jurisdiction conferred
by Congress. 122 The two most common forms of original juris-
diction are federal question jurisdiction 123 and diversity of citi-
zenship jurisdiction. 124 Federal courts have federal question
jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."'1 25 Aviation cases, however,
are almost always governed by state law; thus, federal question
jurisdiction is rarely a basis to get to federal court. 126
Accordingly, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is the most
common basis for bringing an aviation case in federal court.
Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over "all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000" and is between citizens of different states, including
cases where foreign citizens are additional parties, cases between
citizens of a state and subjects of a foreign state, and cases where
a foreign state is a plaintiff and citizens of a state or different
states are defendants. 27 The amount in controversy require-
119 Ryan, supra note 95, at 180.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See Marshall v. Gibson's Prods., Inc. of Plano, 584 F.2d 668, 672 (5th Cir.
1978) ("[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is proper only when prescribed by Congress.").
123 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
124 Id. § 1332.
125 Id. § 1331.
126 Defendants occasionally attempt to remove cases relating to air crashes to
federal court on the basis of federal preemption, arguing that federal statutory
and regulatory law preempts the field of aviation. While federal courts have
largely rejected this approach, they are occasionally successful. See Michael L.
Slack & Donna Bowen, Don't Let Preemption Ground Your Aviation Case, 43 TRIAL
37, 38 (2007).
127 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a).
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ment is almost always met in aviation cases; personal injury
claims often involve serious injuries or deaths that have damages
far in excess of $75,000, and property damage claims on aircraft
typically exceed this amount as well. Thus, diversity jurisdiction
usually turns on the citizenship of the parties.
The diversity of citizenship requirement mandates that all
plaintiffs be of diverse citizenship from all defendants.'28 Indi-
viduals are citizens of the state in which they are "domiciled,"
which is generally determined by the individual's residence and
their intention to remain there. 121 In aviation cases, plaintiffs
often include the estate of the deceased or the next friend of a
minor. Importantly, in such cases it is the citizenship of the de-
ceased or represented individual that is relevant for diversity
purposes, not the citizenship of the personal representative or
administrator. 130
A corporation has two independent bases for citizenship: its
state of incorporation and its principal place of business.13 '
While a corporate defendant's state of incorporation is obvious,
until recently, its principal place of business was not.132 Federal
circuits had taken different views of what constituted a corpora-
tion's principal place of business: some looked to the corporate
headquarters or "nerve center" of the business, while others
considered where a corporation's actual business activities oc-
cured. 3 Still others muddled the two approaches, attempting
to determine the state where the "center of gravity" of the cor-
poration was located.1 3 1 In 2010, in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,135 the
Supreme Court, recognizing the "divergent and increasingly
complex" approaches by the lower courts, attempted to put an
end to the uncertainty.1 36 The Court adopted the "nerve center"
test for determining a corporation's principal place of business,
which "should normally be the place where the corporation
128 See Wis. Dept. of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998).
129 See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 251-52 (4th ed. 2004)
("Most of the litigated problems in the area of domicile concern the acquisition
of a domicile of choice and center about the quality of an individual's physical
presence at the place of the alleged domicile and the nature of his intention or
attitude of mind regarding that place.").
130 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2).
131 Id. § 1332(c)(1).
132 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 89 (2010).
133 See id. at 89-90
134 See id. at 91 (describing lower court cases).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 92.
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maintains its headquarters-provided that the headquarters is
the actual center of direction, control and coordination... and
not simply an office where the corporation holds its board
meetings." ' 7
By adopting this approach, the Court created a test with
greater simplicity and predictability, as it intended. 13 However,
the Court's caveat that a corporation's headquarters may not be
the actual nerve center of the corporation allows for some lee-
way, particularly when a corporation uses its published head-
quarters only sparingly.139 In these situations, parties can make
the case that the true nerve center is elsewhere.1 40 Often, this
will depend heavily on the evidence presented by either side;
notably, in two separate post-Hertz cases out of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, two different judges reached different de-
cisions about the same corporation's principal place of business
based on the level of evidence provided by the same defen-
dant. 1 41 Suffice it to say, a plaintiff that is trying to justify subject
matter jurisdiction, or, conversely, a defendant that is trying to
challenge it, must be prepared to present evidence to satisfy a
court that the state of a corporation's "nerve center" is diverse
from the citizenship of all plaintiffs. 42
Finally, one additional basis for original jurisdiction that fre-
quently arises in aviation cases is "civil case[s] of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction. ' 14 Statute 28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides fed-
eral courts with original jurisdiction over cases that involve mat-
ters arising in navigable waters historically associated with
admiralty law. 144 However, throughout the twentieth century,
land-based aircraft took on many of the same roles that ships
filled, and questions arose as to whether admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction should also cover these claims. 145 In Executive Jet Avi-
137 Id. at 92-93.
138 Id. at 95.
139 Id. at 95-96.
140 See Agostini v. Piper Aircraft Corp., No. 11-7172, 2012 WL 646025, at *1-4
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2012) (determining that a company's principal place of busi-
ness was in Pennsylvania, despite having an alleged corporate headquarters in
Massachusetts).
141 Compare id., with Lewis v. Lycoming, No. 11-6475, 2012 WL 2422451, at *5-6
(E.D. Pa. June 27, 2012).
142 See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 92-93; Wis. Dept. of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S.
381, 388 (1998).
143 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
144 See Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264, 265 (3d Cir. 1969).
145 See In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, N.Y. on Nov. 12, 2001, MDL No. 1448,
2006 WL 1288298, at *1350 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006) ("Federal courts long have
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ation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,146 the Supreme Court established a
two-prong test for determining whether an aviation case was sub-
ject to maritime jurisdiction: (1) the situs of the crash must be in
navigable waters; and (2) there must be some nexus between
the type of activity involved and traditional maritime activity.147
The first element is relatively broad and straightforward: "[i] t
has long been the rule in the United States that all waters within
the ebb and flow of the tide are considered navigable waters." '148
The second element can be more complicated. When an aircraft
performs "a function traditionally performed by waterborne ves-
sels," there is a sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activi-
ties.1 49 "Federal courts have concluded nearly unanimously that
transoceanic or island voyages that, but for air travel, would have
been conducted by sea have a significant relationship to mari-
time activity."15 Thus, in the many cases that arise out of crashes
of aircraft on navigable waters, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) can provide
an additional avenue for plaintiffs to bring suit in federal
court. 151
2. Preventing Removal
Regardless of the forum the plaintiff chooses, a plaintiff can-
not prevent a defendant from attempting to change the venue
in certain ways. Every jurisdiction, state or federal, has a version
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens,1 52 and defendants can
always attempt to transfer a case within the judicial system where
struggled with the issue of when aviation accidents are properly encompassed
within admiralty jurisdiction.").
146 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
147 Id. at 268.
148 Isla Nena Air Servs., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 380 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78
(D.P.R. 2005) (citing cases).
149 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 218-19 (1986).
150 In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, 2006 WL 1288298, at *1353 (citing cases). But
see U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft, Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131,
1141 (10th Cir. 2009) (crash in international waters on flight "for the express
purpose of aircraft evaluation and demonstration" was not sufficiently related to
traditional maritime activities to invoke admiralty jurisdiction); Kapar v. Kuwait
Airways Corp., 845 F.2d 1100, 1104 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding that hijacking
in flight over international waters was not subject to admiralty jurisdiction be-
cause it was "only fortuitously and incidentally connected to navigable waters");
Brons v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 627 F. Supp. 230, 233 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (finding
that crash on training flight over the waters was "totally fortuitous" and rejecting
the application of admiralty jurisdiction and maritime law).
15, See infra Section III.B.3.
152 See infra Section III.D.
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the action was brought. 15 However, if a plaintiff elects to file in
state court, there are certain precautions that can end any effort
to remove the case to federal court before it begins.
First, plaintiffs can prevent removal premised on diversity ju-
risdiction by joining in-state or non-diverse defendants.1 54 For a
defendant to remove a case to federal court on diversity
grounds, no properly joined and served defendant may be a citi-
zen of the state where the action was filed.1 55 Aircraft often con-
tain component parts manufactured by numerous entities
located in various states, and they are frequently maintained by
entities throughout the country. 156 An aircraft's log books or list
of components can provide a plaintiff with numerous targets for
joining an in-state or non-diverse defendant. 57 If such a party is
joined, the removing defendant's only option is often to prove
that the non-diverse or in-state defendant has been improperly
or fraudulently joined, which is a very heavy burden to meet.1 58
If a state's pleading andjoinder rules allow it, a plaintiff wishing
to preserve a state court forum could file suit against any in-state
defendant alone, and then, after service has been perfected,
join any out-of-state defendants.1 59
Second, if a case is removed, the plaintiff should immediately
take note of the grounds for removal and attempt to spot both
substantive and procedural defects. If the case lacks subject mat-
terjurisdiction on its face, a plaintiff can move to remand at any
time. 160 However, if the defect is merely procedural, such as
timeliness or because one of the defendants is a citizen of the
forum state, the plaintiff must move to remand within thirty days
of removal, or the defect can be considered waived. 161 If the
153 See infra Section III.C.
154 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) (2).
155 Id. ("A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdic-
tion under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought.").
156 E.g., Eason v. Linden Avionics, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 311, 321 (D.NJ. 1989).
157 See, e.g., Yellen v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 490, 503
(E.D. Pa. 2011).
158 See infra Section III.B.1.
159 See Centaurus Unity v. Lexington Ins. Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 780, 790 n.27
(S.D. Tex. 2011) (finding that state joinder laws should be used in determining
whether there has been a fraudulent or improper misjoinder "since the claimant
was required to follow the state's joinder rules when it initially brought suit").
-6 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
161 Id.
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plaintiff fails to timely move to remand, all of the precautions
taken to prevent removal would be undone.
III. THE DEFENDANT'S OPTIONS
A. CHALLENGING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A defendant's first consideration should be whether the court
has personal jurisdiction over it under the current state of the
law.'62 The general law relating to personal jurisdiction and the
impact of these cases was discussed at length in Part I.B., but
defendants should nonetheless be mindful of the requirements
of challenging personal jurisdiction. Requirements sometimes
vary under the laws of the various states and federal circuits, but
some general prerequisites should always be met. 63 First, lack of
personal jurisdiction must be asserted in the defendant's first
pleading or it is generally considered to be waived. 164 Second,
while the ultimate burden of establishing jurisdiction is on the
plaintiff, the defendant generally has the initial burden of pro-
viding affidavit testimony or other evidence showing that per-
sonal jurisdiction does not exist.'65 Third, the defendant should
be mindful of whether the state's laws require an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction.' 66 Recent cases
such as Daimler will serve to make jurisdictional challenge a
much more effective tool, but defendants must be prepared to
meet all of the requirements to challenge jurisdiction from the
outset.
16 7
B. REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT
If the case is filed in state court, a defendant may consider
removing the case to federal court. Federal courts may have a
number of procedural or strategic advantages over state courts
162 See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Walden v. Fiore,
134 S. Ct. 1115 (201 4 );J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F. Supp. 503
(C.D. Cal. 1992).
163 See T. Steven Har, Representing Foreign Defendants in the U.S. Courts A Global
Economy Means Global Litigation, 14 No. 3 PRAc. LITIGATOR 27, 32 (May 2003).
Compare SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 4(d) (5), with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-9C-201 (a) (2).
164 See FED. R. Cw. P. 12(h)(1).
165 See, e.g., Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247,
1249 (11th Cir. 2000).
166 See, e.g., TEX. R. Crv. P. 120a; Milacron Inc. v. Performance Rail Tie, L.P.,
262 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (noting that a defen-
dant objecting to personal jurisdiction must ask for and secure a hearing).
167 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746.
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for defendants.16 Federal procedural rules are frequently more
developed and uniform than their state court counterparts, giv-
ing plaintiffs fewer opportunities to take advantage of looser
rules or practices in a state court forum.1 69 Furthermore, as dis-
cussed in more detail below, being in federal court opens up
other avenues to changing the venue, including federal transfer
of venue statutes.1 7 0 If a case is pending in federal court, parties
seeking to change the venue to another state need not seek dis-
missal and refile in the other state's court system; instead, the
district court can simply transfer the case to a sister federal court
in the defendant's proposed forum. 17 1
At the outset, the defendant must determine if the case is re-
movable on its face, and if so, ensure that all procedural require-
ments are satisfied.172 First, the case must be removed within
thirty days of service of process upon the last-served defen-
dant.1 7 3 Second, the removing defendant must obtain the writ-
ten consent of every other properly joined and served
defendant.1 74 If the defendant does not timely accomplish these
tasks, then any effort at removal is likely doomed from the
start.1 7 5 If the procedural requirements can be met, then the de-
fendant must ensure that a federal court would have federal sub-
168 See WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., CALIFORNA PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL
CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2:2191 (National ed., The Rutter Group) (ob-
serving that "removal is sought on the basis of what defendants perceive to be the
practical and strategic advantages of litigating the case in federal court, rather than
state court") (emphasis in original).
169 See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591,
618 (2006).
170 A prime example is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), in which
the defendants removed a case originally filed in state court in California, had it
transferred to a federal district court in Pennsylvania, and finally obtained forum
non conveniens dismissal of the case to Scotland. See generally id.; Richard D.
Freer, Refracting Domestic and Global Choice-of-Forum Doctrine Through the Lens of a
Single Case, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REv. 959, 963-73 (2007) (describing the procedural
history of Reyno and praising the defendants' strategy of "incremental assault on
the plaintiffs forum selection").
171 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406, 1631.
172 See Vasquez v. Americano U.S.A., LLC, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1257 (D. N.M.
2008).
173 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
174 Id. § 1446(b) (2) (A); see also Vasquez, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 1258 ("To join a
notice of removal is to support it in writing.").
175 See Britton v. Rolls Royce Engine Servs., No. C 05-01057 SI, 2005 WL
1562855, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2005) (remanding due to untimeliness of
removal).
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ject matter jurisdiction over the case. 176 The requirements to
satisfy the forms of original subject matter jurisdiction that are
primarily relevant in aviation cases are discussed in detail in Part
I.D. However, defendants should be aware of additional bases
for removal that may allow them to access a federal forum de-
spite a plaintiffs efforts to avoid it.
1. Fraudulent/Improper Joinder
When faced with an in-state or non-diverse defendant, a di-
verse out-of-state defendant may attempt removal on the
grounds of fraudulent or improper joinder. 177 This doctrine
provides that the citizenship of an in-state or non-diverse defen-
dant may be disregarded if the out-of-state defendant demon-
strates to the court that the 'plaintiff does not actually have a
viable claim against that party. 178 Early in a case, if a plaintiff has
even a plausible theory against an in-state or non-diverse defen-
dant, this will usually be sufficient to avoid removal based on
fraudulent joinder. 179 If it becomes clear as the case develops
that a defendant has been joined solely to keep a case out of
federal court, a diverse defendant can later attempt to remove
the case to federal court within thirty days of discovering the
basis for removal. 80 If that discovery takes place more than one
year after commencement of the lawsuit, however, the defen-
dant must also show that "the plaintiff acted in bad faith in or-
der to prevent a defendant from removing the action." 8
Regardless of the timing, defendants are generally faced with a
heavy burden of persuasion if they wish to justify removal on this
ground.182
176 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
177 In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2006).
178 See Yellen v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 490, 503 (E.D.
Pa. 2011) ("The fraudulent joinder line of cases distills to a simple principle: a
court cannot permit a plaintiff to join a straw-man defendant solely to deprive
removal-eligible defendants of a federal forum to which they are otherwise
entitled.").
179 See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647-48 (5th Cir. 2003).
180 See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) ("Except as provided in subsection (c), if the
case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be
filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise,
of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it
may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.").
181 Id. § 1446(c) (1).
182 See Travis, 326 F.3d at 649 ("The burden of persuasion on those who claim
fraudulent joinder is a heavy one."); Yellen, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
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2. Federal Officer Removal
Defendants in aviation cases occasionally have the opportu-
nity to remove a case on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), gener-
ally referred to as the "federal officer removal" statute. In
relevant part, this statute permits the removal of actions brought
against "any person acting under" the United States or any of its
agents or officers for acts committed under the color of such
office. 8 ' Government contractors have used this statute to re-
move actions to federal court on this basis alone."8 Federal of-
ficer removal requires the removing party to meet four
elements: (1) the defendant must be a person; (2) the federal
government or a federal officer must have directed the defen-
dant to take action; (3) the action was the causal nexus of the
plaintiff's claim; and (4) a colorable federal defense must exist
as to the claim.'8 5 To successfully assert this basis for removal,
the defendant must be able to show more than just federal regu-
lation in "considerable detail," but actual government interven-
tion, control, or direction.1 86
One of the most common types of federal officer removals in
the aviation context is when an individual defendant takes an
action causally related to the plaintiff's claims in his role as a
designated agent of the Federal Aviation Administration."' At
least one court has imputed such actions to the individual's em-
ployer to permit removal, even though that individual was not
named as a defendant."8 8 Other courts have rejected this expan-
sion, noting "FAA designees and their employers are distinct le-
gal entities."'8 9 This statute can be a valuable tool if the facts can
show sufficient government control and direction to justify fed-
eral jurisdiction.
183 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
184 See Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1428 (11th Cir. 1996).
185 Andrew E. Shipley & John F. Henault, Federal Officer Removal: The Misunder-
stood Removal Statute, 60-MAY FED. LAw. 72, 72 (May 2013) (citing Mesa v. Califor-
nia, 489 U.S. 121 (1989)).
186 See Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 145 (2010); Shipley &
Henault, supra note 185, at 72.
187 See Magnin, 91 F.3d at 1428-29.
188 AIG Europe (UK) Ltd. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. CV 02-8703-GAF,
2003 WL 257702, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2003).
189 West v. A & S Helicopters, 751 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1110 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
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3. Removal Based upon Admiralty Jurisdiction
Statute 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) provides a basis for federal juris-
diction over civil cases arising under admiralty jurisdiction.190
The location of a crash frequently brings a subsequent lawsuit
within the ambit of federal maritime law or the Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA)."9' However, the option of taking ad-
vantage of federal jurisdiction was traditionally reserved for
plaintiffs. The admiralty jurisdiction statute contains a unique
"saving to suitors" clause, which preserves to plaintiffs "all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.1 9 2 Courts have
interpreted this clause to provide state and federal courts with
concurrent jurisdiction over in personam maritime claims. 9
Furthermore, because of this clause, courts consistently held
that removal of admiralty claims was barred unless there was an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.'9 4
However, Congress's amendments to the removal statute in
the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of
2011,19 5 perhaps unintentionally, have opened the door to re-
moval based solely upon admiralty jurisdiction.'96 The statute,
which remained unchanged in relevant part, states that "any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed
by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending."' 97 Prior to 2011, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b) stated that:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdic-
tion founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without
regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other
such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in in-
terest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
State in which such action is brought.'
190 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
19' See 46 U.S.C. § 30307 (establishing when DOHSA is applicable to commer-
cial aviation accidents).
192 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
193 See Madruga v. Super. Ct., 346 U.S. 556, 560-61 (1954).
194 E.g., Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 220 (5th Cir. 2013)
(interpreting an older version of the statute).
195 Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758.
196 See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).
197 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
198 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
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"Although the district courts have original jurisdiction over
maritime cases, maritime law claims in general were not viewed
as 'arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States."' 199 Accordingly, removal based upon admiralty jurisdic-
tion alone was not permitted.20 ° In the 2011 amendments, Con-
gress altered 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) to delete the language that
referred to any civil action "founded on a claim or right arising
under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. 20 1
With that language eliminated, the plain language of the statute
could be interpreted as discarding the requirement that diver-
sity must exist for removal to be effectuated in cases that fall
under federal courts' original jurisdiction but do not necessarily
arise under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
States.2
With this semantic change, admiralty defendants have at-
tempted to remove cases solely on the grounds of admiralty ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). In Ryan v. Hercules Offshore,
Inc., the district court reviewed these changes to the statute and
concluded that the effect of this change was to permit the re-
moval of any claims over which a district court has "original ju-
risdiction," which includes cases that arise under admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction. 20 3 Departing from decades of precedent
interpreting the previous version of the removal statute, the
court allowed the removal of claims under DOHSA and admi-
ralty law without requiring that the parties be diverse.20 4 Some
district courts have since followed suit,20 5 but others have vocif-
erously disagreed. 6 Certain courts have based their decision to
remand on the fact that removal to federal court on the basis of
-9 Charles S. Davant, Navigating New Waters: The Impact of Recent Changes to the
Federal Removal Statute in Maritime Law, 33 TmiAL ADvoc. Q. 23, 24 (2014).
200 Tenn. Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 153 (5th Cir.
1996).
201 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758; Davant, supra note 199, at 24.
202 See Davant, supra note 199, at 24.
203 Ryan v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777-78 (S.D. Tex.
2013).
204 Id. at 778.
205 E.g., Provost v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89-SDD-SCR, 2014 WL
2515412, at *3 (M.D. La. June 4, 2014); Wells v. Abe's Boat Rentals Inc., No. H-
13-1112, 2013 WL 3110322, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2013).
206 E.g., Figueroa v. Marine Inspection Servs., 28 F. Supp. 3d 677, 680-81 (S.D.
Tex. 2014); Rogers v. BBC Chartering Am., LLC, No. 4:13-CV-3741, 2014 WL
819400, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2014); Barry v. Shell Oil Co., No. 13-6133, 2014
WL 775662, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2014).
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admiralty jurisdiction may strip a plaintiff of the right to a jury
trial.2 °7 The amendment to the removal statute may have been
intended to clarify jurisdiction rules, but at least as to admiralty
jurisdiction, it has had the opposite effect.20° While there is a
split of authority on the issue among the district courts, 20 9 it is
now clear that at least a colorable basis exists to remove a case
based solely upon admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.
C. TRANSFER OF VENUE
One of the most common mechanisms for changing the fo-
rum is seeking a transfer of venue within the judicial system in
which the action was filed. 0 If the plaintiff's chosen venue is
improper, or if another venue would be more convenient, the
defendant may request that the case be transferred to a proper
or more convenient forum.2 1  This section discusses the most
prominent transfer statutes that defendants can rely on, and the
critical impact of a recent Supreme Court decision that drasti-
cally enhanced the power of forum selection clauses.
207 See Coronel v. AK Victory, 1 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1188 (W.D. Wash. 2014)
(stating that removal based solely on admiralty jurisdiction "would deprive the
plaintiff of his long-recognized choice of remedies, including, potentially, his
right to ajury trial").
208 See Matthew H. Ammerman, The New Removal Regime, 38 TUL. MAR. LJ. 389,
409-11 (2014).
209 See Bourdreaux v. Global Offshore Resources, LLC, No. 14-2507, 2015 WL
419002 (W.D. La. Jan. 30, 2015). This case provided a detailed summary and list
of the published cases that support both interpretations of the amended statute.
Judge Hill characterized the position that the 2011 amendments did not change
the law to permit the removal of claims based on 28 U.S.C. § 1333(a) without an
independent basis for removal as the "majority view," and ultimately sided with
that approach. Id. at *4-5, *7.
210 If removal from state court to federal court is successful, this can open the
door to interstate transfer between federal courts. E.g., Piper Aircraft Corp. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1981); Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d
602, 605 (10th Cir. 1998). If removal is unsuccessful, however, the defendant
must rely upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens to change the venue to
another state. See infra Section III.D.
211 If a case cannot be removed to federal court, defendants also have the abil-
ity to pursue transfers within the state court system, and would be wise to look at
their options in those cases as well, with an eye toward how the state's standards
are different from federal standards. As discussed below, if a case is pending in
state court, it cannot be transferred to another state court and the moving defen-
dant must rely upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See infra Section
III.D.
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1. Transfer to Fix the Venue
Plaintiffs tend to file suit in jurisdictions where there is at least
some possibility that venue will be sustained; therefore, motions
attempting to change venue on the grounds of convenience are
the most common types of transfer motions seen in aviation
cases. On the rare occasion when the plaintiffs chosen venue is
wholly improper, 28 U.S.C. § 1406 allows for transfer of venue
when it is necessary for the action to continue at all.212 This sec-
tion applies to cases filed in an improper venue, requiring a
court to "dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case" to a proper venue. 21' This form of transfer, while
rare, can be used when a plaintiff attempts to file suit in a fed-
eral court that has such an attenuated connection to the case
that venue would be considered improper.2 14
2. Transfer for Convenience
Just because a venue is proper does not mean it cannot be
changed. The most commonly used transfer statute is 28 U.S.C.§ 1404(a), which permits the transfer of a case "Iflor the conve-
nience of the parties and witnesses" and "in the interest ofjus-
tice" to any federal district to which the parties have consented
or where the case may have been brought.21 5 Such transfer mo-
tions generally follow a multi-step process. 2 16 The court must
first determine whether the case could have been brought in the
requested transferee forum. This inquiry involves a determina-
tion of whether it is a proper venue and whether all of the de-
fendants would be subject to personal jurisdiction in that
forum.
2 1 7
If the transferee forum is a proper venue, the court must
weigh both private and public interest factors to determine
212 See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). A defendant can also move to dismiss a case on the
grounds of improper venue. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(3). Doing so, however, will
allow the plaintiff a second chance to pick the forum. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). A
motion to transfer will allow the defendant to identify and advocate for its own
chosen forum in the first challenge to venue. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b).
213 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
214 See id.
215 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
216 See Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc. v. Nat'l Prods. Corp., 230 F. Supp. 2d 655, 658
(E.D. Pa. 2002).
217 Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. Magellan Navigation, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d
1169, 1172 (W.D. Wisc. 2007) (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344
(1960)).
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whether they weigh in favor of transfer.218 While the specific fac-
tors vary slightly between the circuits, they generally focus on
similar interests. 219 The private interest factors focus on the in-
terests of the parties and those affected by the case.22' These
factors usually include the relative ease of access to sources of
proof, the availability of compulsory process to secure the at-
tendance of witnesses, the cost of attendance of willing wit-
nesses, and all other practical issues that may prevent a trial
from being easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.221 In aviation
cases, evidence concerning the location of the crash site, the lo-
cation and availability of third-party witnesses such as accident
investigators, first responders, and maintenance companies who
worked on the aircraft, the location of documentary evidence
about the aircraft and its parts, and the locations of the parties
are all relevant to the court's weighing of the private interest
factors.222
The public interest factors, by contrast, focus on the interests
of the court system and the public in general.223 These factors
include the administrative difficulties flowing from court con-
gestion, the local interest in having localized disputes decided at
home, the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern
the case, and the avoidance of unnecessary problems with con-
flicts of law or the application of foreign laws.2 24 Important con-
siderations in aviation cases relevant to the public interest
factors can include the forum's involvement in the investigation,
choice of law considerations, and the pendency of other actions
related to the same crash, which impacts judicial economy. 225
Additionally, courts give substantial weight to the plaintiffs
218 At. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct.
568, 581 (2013).
219 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). Compare In reVolk-
swagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008), with Creative Tech.,
Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1995).
220 See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6.
221 E.g., In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315.
222 See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 477 F. Supp. 142, 143
(D.D.C. 1979) (finding that the location of the wreckage and the documents and
witnesses connected with "the manufacturer, testing, and sale of the subject air-
craft" in transferee forum favored transfer).
223 See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 n.6.
224 In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315.
225 Cf In re W. Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 1299, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2007)
(noting the general interest in "the consolidation of multiple lawsuits arising out
of a single air disaster in a single forum state").
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choice of forum, particularly when the plaintiff resides there.2 26
Nevertheless, courts also consider whether the plaintiff engaged
in forum shopping in determining how much weight to give the
plaintiff's choice. 27
When a plaintiff brings suit far from the crash site or location
of other critical operative facts of the case, and the case is either
brought in or removed to federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) can
be a powerful tool. Plaintiffs will often stress the most tenuous
connections to justify a favorable forum, but this tactic will not
protect them if a different forum is more convenient.228 Often-
times, the most convenient forum will be the location of the
crash, which is where eyewitnesses, first responders, and investi-
gators are usually located, as well as critical evidence such as the
wreckage and medical or autopsy records. 29 Other times, courts
will consider the location of a manufacturer's or maintainer's
allegedly negligent conduct to be the most convenient forum.3 0
If a plaintiff chooses a forum based solely on the presence of
one marginal defendant, the residence of one plaintiff, or the
location of one of numerous actions that are relevant to the
case, a motion to transfer to a demonstrably more convenient
forum has a strong chance of success.
3. Transfer to Cure a Want of Jurisdiction
Dovetailing with the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 231 is an often
overlooked and underutilized statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which
permits a court to transfer venue to cure a want of personal ju-
risdiction.28 2 To transfer a case under this statute, three ele-
ments must be met: "(1) the transferring court lacks
226 See Schindelheim v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) (favoring plaintiffs' choice of home forum after giving "substantial weight"
to the fact that crash victims' residence was in New York).
227 See Grace v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, No. 02 CIV. 6612 (RMB),
2004 WL 639468, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2004).
228 Cf Schindelheim, 202 F. Supp. at 315-17.
229 Cf Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 477 F. Supp. 142, 143 (D.D.C.
1979).
230 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 820 F. Supp.
503, 507 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (finding that California, the venue where the events
causing a brake failure that led to a crash, was more convenient than Texas,
where the crash took place).
231 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) has also been utilized to transfer cases to a forum that
has personal jurisdiction over a defendant where the transferor court lacks per-
sonal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mangia Media Inc. v. Univ. Pipeline, Inc., 846 F. Supp.
2d 319, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
232 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
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jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised juris-
diction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in
the interest ofjustice. ' '23 3 When one or more defendants success-
fully challenge personal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 permits a
court to transfer the case to a forum that has personal jurisdic-
tion. 234 Essentially, this statute is a fallback option for a court
that finds that one or more defendants are not subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction, but does not want to dismiss the case.235 Be-
cause aviation cases often involve numerous defendants from
across the country or the world, including aircraft and compo-
nent manufacturers and sellers, aircraft owners, maintenance fa-
cilities, and pilots, one or more defendants very likely will have
legitimate challenges to personal jurisdiction.2 6 This is espe-
cially true if the case is brought in a venue far from where the
aircraft operated or crashed 7.2 3  Furthermore, as discussed in
part I.B.1, the Supreme Court's decision in Daimler is likely to
increase both the number and the success rate of challenges to
personal jurisdiction.238 With personal jurisdiction now more
limited in light of Daimler, transfers to cure a want ofjurisdiction
will likely become more common, and 28 U.S.C. § 1631 will be-
come an important tool for defendants. Utilizing this statute will
allow a defendant the opportunity to advocate for a potential
alternative forum, which seeking outright dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction does not provide.
4. Atlantic Marine and Transfers Involving Forum Selection
Clauses
Many aviation cases involve tort claims with victims who had
no contractual relationship with any of the potential defend-
ants. 239 However, disputes between a manufacturer and an air-
233 Molina-Camacho v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2004).
234 28 U.S.C. § 1631; see Ross v. Colo. Outward Bound Sch., Inc., 822 F.2d 1524,
1526-27 (10th Cir. 1987); Gallant v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 111 F. Supp. 2d
638, 644-45 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
235 See Ross, 822 F.2d at 1526.
236 See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014);
Crouch v. Honeywell Intern, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 788, 791-92 (W.D. Ky. 2010);
Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 533-34 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
237 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 1045 S. Ct. 1868,
1870-71 (1984).
238 See supra Section II.B.1.
239 See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp.,
263 F. App'x 604, 605 (9th Cir. 2008); Bieberle v. United States, 255 F. Supp. 2d
1190, 1193 (D. Kan. 2003).
553
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
craft purchaser or operator, or a claim only involving damage to
the aircraft, may be limited to claims based in contract.240 Such
claims will often involve a forum selection clause. 24 ' A recent
Supreme Court decision, Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v.
United States District Court,24 2 substantially altered the transfer
analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) when a valid forum selection
clause is present.
Enforcement of forum selection clauses have long been fa-
vored in the federal courts,243 but until recently, it was just one
of many factors to consider in a "flexible and individualized"
transfer analysis.244 In Atlantic Marine, however, the Supreme
Court departed from the discretion generally vested in the dis-
trict courts and gave such clauses a substantially greater im-
pact.245 The Court held that a forum selection clause changes
the traditional transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in
three ways. 2 4 6 First, the plaintiffs choice of forum is now entitled
to no weight, and the burden of convincing the court to disre-
gard the forum selection clause falls on the plaintiff.247 Second,
the private interest factors are eliminated from the analysis; only
the public interest factors may be considered. 24 The Court
deemed an agreement to a forum selection clause to be a waiver
of all private convenience-related concerns about the forum.249
Finally, regardless of the original choice of forum, the choice of
law rules of the forum specified in the forum selection clause
must be applied.2 50
240 See, e.g., Reno Flying Servs., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04346 NC,
2014 WL 6629531, at *1-5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014); Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.
v. Apical Indus., Inc., No. 6:13-cv-00015, 2013 WL 2297066, at *8 (W.D. La. May
23, 2013).
241 See Kostelac v. Allianz Glob. Corp. & Specialty AG, 517 F. App'x 670, 672-73
(11th Cir. 2013).
242 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013).
243 Estate of Myhra v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F. 3d 1233, 1238 (11th
Cir. 2012); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1912-13 (1972).
244 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-30 (1988) (noting that
a forum selection clause "will be a significant factor that figures centrally in the
district court's calculus").
245 See Alex J. Whitman, Assessing Atlantic Marine: How the Supreme Court's
Strengthening of the Forum Selection Clause Will Impact Aviation Cases, 1 ABA YOUNG
LAws. DIVISION AiR & SPACE LAw COMMITTEE NEWSL., No. 2,Jan. 2014, at 5 (pro-
viding analysis regarding Atlantic Marine).
246 Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581.
247 Id. at 581-82.
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The effect of Atlantic Marine is profound. In essence, absent
exceptional circumstances, valid forum selection clauses must
be enforced by the courts, making them extremely powerful
tools for aviation defendants.25 1 In fact, a recent Fifth Circuit
decision involving a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Mexico
found that a forum selection clause applicable to only one of
several defendants, which was included in an unsigned warranty
provision, had to be enforced regardless of the effect enforce-
ment had on the defendants who were not subject to the forum
selection clause. 252 As a result, a case involving an indivisible in-
jury caused by the actions of three separate potentially liable de-
fendants was severed into separate actions in separate forums.253
Under Atlantic Marine, parties' contracts with forum selection
clauses, even ones included in unsigned form warranties, 254
would appear to trump most considerations of convenience, ju-
dicial economy, or practicality. Furthermore, even outside of the
context of motions to transfer, Atlantic Marine was nothing less
than a full-throated endorsement of forum selection clauses,
which can be used to support other efforts to dismiss in favor of
state or international forums as well.255 Thus, as it stands now,
Atlantic Marine has tilted the playing field substantially in favor
of defendants who can point to a forum selection clause, even if
there is no evidence that the clause was a material, bargained-for
part of a contract-and even if the clause is in a document that
was never signed or acknowledged by the plaintiff.256
Atlantic Marine has had an immediate impact on litigation in
the lower courts. As of the date of the submission of this article,
just over a year after the case was decided, Atlantic Marine has
been cited in over 350 published cases. 2 57 However, while the
Supreme Court likely intended to establish a bright line rule,
lower courts are struggling to apply the principles of Atlantic
Marine in different fact patterns. For example, in reversing a dis-
251 See id.
252 In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 681 (5th Cir. 2014).
253 Id. at 683.
254 See Lyon v. First Choice Loan Servs., Inc., No. 15-cv-00269-CMA-NYW, 2015
WL 3956366, at *3 (D. Colo. June 29, 2015).
255 See Pappas v. Kerzner Int'l Bah. Ltd., 585 F. App'x 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2014)
(relying upon Atlantic Marine to support forum non conveniens dismissal in favor
of Bahamas pursuant to forum selection clause).
256 See Lyon, 2015 WL 3956366, at *3; Barilotti v. Island Hotel Co., No. 13-
23672-CIV, 2014 WL 1803374, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2014).
257 See Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. 568 (Westlaw KeyCite as of February 12, 2015).
As of November 8, 2015, Atlantic Marine has been cited in over 600 cases. Id.
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trict court's conclusion that Atlantic Marine did not eliminate a
district court's discretion on whether to grant or deny severance
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 in a case involving
nonparties to the forum selection clause, the Fifth Circuit fash-
ioned a new three-part test for severance and transfer in cases
where a forum selection clause is present, which does not ap-
pear to consider the public interest transfer factors specifically
preserved by Atlantic Marine.258 Other courts have come to diver-
gent conclusions when there are multiple forum selection
clauses with multiple defendants that point to different forums;
one court applied Atlantic Marine and split up the case, 259 while
another disregarded Atlantic Marine entirely.260 Still other courts
have declined to apply Atlantic Marine and do not give a forum
selection clause controlling weight when the language of the
clause is permissive rather than mandatory. 261 As the lower
courts continue to struggle with the effect of Atlantic Marine, fur-
ther guidance from the Supreme Court will likely be necessary.
D. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
When a case is pending in federal court and a defendant
wishes to move the case to a different forum within the United
States, the federal transfer statutes provide a well-established
method of doing so. 262 However, if the change of venue would
involve an entirely different court system, such as from one state
court's system to another or from a federal court to the courts of
a foreign country, the defendant must utilize the related doc-
258 Compare In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 681 (5th Cir. 2014) (district
courts are to (1) weigh the private factors in favor of the contractually agreed
forum; (2) consider the private factors as to non-signatories to the forum selec-
tion agreement; and (3) determine whether this weighing is outweighed by the
interest of judicial economy of having all claims considered in a single lawsuit),
with Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (stating that "a district court may consider
arguments about public-interest factors only").
259 See 1-Stop Fin. Serv. Ctrs. of Am., LLC v. Astonish Results, LLC, No. A-13-
CA-961-SS, 2014 WL 279669, at *9-11 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2014) (severing and
transferring claims asserted by plaintiffs against two defendants to two different
forums based upon separate forum selection clauses).
26 See Samuels v. Medytox Sols., Inc., No. CIV.A. 13-7212 SDW, 2014 WL
4441943, at *7-8 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2014) (refusing to apply Atlantic Marine when
plaintiff filed claims against two defendants, each with valid forum selection
clauses in their favor, specifying different forums).
261 See, e.g., Networld Commc'ns, Corp. v. Croatia Airlines, D.D., No. CIV.A. 13-
4770 SDW, 2014 WL 4724625, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2014); RELCO Locomo-
tives, Inc. v. AllRail, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1085 (S.D. Iowa 2014).
262 See supra Section III.C.
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263trine of forum non conveniens. This doctrine is especially
helpful to defendants in aviation cases where the crash took
place on foreign soil, as foreign crash cases are frequently
brought in the United States against U.S. companies and manu-
facturers to take advantage of the United States' more generous
damages system.264 While there is "ordinarily a strong presump-
tion in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum, ' 265 although less
so for foreign plaintiffs,266 courts have not hesitated to dismiss
cases in favor of more convenient foreign forums in the face of a
strong evidentiary showing by the defendant.267
While certain factors or standards vary by jurisdiction, analysis
of a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens generally
follows a three-step process.2 68 First, the defendant must show
that the forum is "available" to address the dispute. 2 6' This re-
quirement is satisfied when the defendant is subject to jurisdic-
tion in the proposed alternative forum. 270 When the proposed
alternative forum is the jurisdiction where the crash took place,
defendants will normally not contest whether they are subject to
jurisdiction in that forum. 27 1 Further, in most cases, because the
remedies available in the proposed alternative forum are much
more favorable for defendants, parties seeking to take advantage
263 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); Lambert v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 332 Ill. App. 375, 378 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
264 Thad Thano Dameris et al., The United States is No Longer the Courthouse for the
World, 22 No. 1 AIR & SPACE LAW. 9, 12 (2008) (citing Reyno, 454 U.S. at 252
n.18).
265 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 255.
266 La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 1983).
267 E.g., Reyno, 454 U.S. at 261; Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 244 F.3d
1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001); Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir.
2008); Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1429-31 (11th Cir.
1996); Dahl v. United Techs. Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1032-33 (3d Cir. 1980); Mel-
gares v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 231, 237, 252-53 (D. Conn.
2009); Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 807-09 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
268 Certain courts include a fourth step: whether the plaintiffs can reinstate
their suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.
Galbert v. W. Caribbean Airways, 715 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2013); Leon v.
Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1309-11 (11th Cir. 2001).
269 In reAir Crash Near Athens, Greece on Aug. 15, 2005, 479 F. Supp. 2d 792,
797 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
270 See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22 ("Ordinarily, this requirement will be satis-
fied when the defendant is 'amenable to process' in the other jurisdiction.") (cit-
ing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947)).
271 See In reAir Crash Over the Taiwan Straits on May 25, 2002, 331 F. Supp. 2d
1176, 1180-83 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Zermeno v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 246 F.
Supp. 646, 651 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
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of forum non conveniens dismissal will often consent or stipu-
late to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.2 7 2
Second, the moving defendant must show that the proposed
alternative forum is "adequate" to resolve the dispute.273 A fo-
rum is "adequate" if it can provide for the litigation of the sub-
ject matter of the dispute and potentially offer redress for the
plaintiffs' injuries. 274 Importantly, plaintiffs cannot complain
that the theories of liability are different or that their damages
would be less under the foreign forum's law; so long as it is
shown that they have a remedy and will be treated fairly, the
alternative forum will be considered adequate. 27' As the reme-
dies provided by American courts are usually far more generous
than their foreign counterparts, this precedent is very favorable
for defendants.276
Additionally, while the moving party has the burden to estab-
lish that an alternative forum is adequate, plaintiffs must never-
theless raise any reason to the trial court why the forum may be
inadequate.277 In Galbert v. W. Caribbean Airways, the plaintiffs,
who were representatives of decedents killed in the crash of an
aircraft flying between Panama and Martinique, originally filed
suit in the Southern District of Florida, but their claims were
dismissed for forum non conveniens in favor of the courts of
Martinique. 27 The Martinique court subsequently determined,
however, that because the plaintiffs initially chose to file suit in
the Southern District of Florida, the court was precluded by the
Montreal Convention from exercising jurisdiction over the
272 See King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 562 F.3d 1374, 1382 (11 th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing that Italy, the site of an aircraft crash, was an available alternative forum "be-
cause Cessna is willing to submit to jurisdiction and is amenable to process
there"); Magnin, 91 F.3d at 1429 ("Here the defendants agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of an alternative forum (in France), rendering that forum availa-
ble."); Da Rocha v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (stipulation by aircraft and engine manufacturers to jurisdiction
of Brazil's courts made forum available).
273 In re Air Crash Near Athens, Greece, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
274 See King, 562 F.3d at 1382. Usually, this can be demonstrated with the affida-
vit of an attorney from the proposed alternative jurisdiction. Da Rocha, 451 F.
Supp. 2d at 1322.
275 Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1981); Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d
1137, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2001).
276 See Freer, supra note 170, at 973-74 (discussing the effect of this aspect of
Reyno's holding).
277 Galbert v. W. Caribbean Airways, 715 F.3d 1290, 1295 (lth Cir. 2013).
278 Id. at 1292-93.
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case. 279 Based on that ruling, the plaintiffs moved in the Florida
district court to vacate the original dismissal order.2 0 The dis-
trict court denied their motion.28 1 On appeal, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the denial, concluding that, because the plaintiff
did not raise the Montreal Convention issue in their opposition
to the forum non conveniens motion, they waived their argu-
ment.2 2 Thus, Galber underscores the importance of raising all
arguments in opposition to a forum non conveniens motion, re-
gardless of who has the burden of proof.
Finally, the moving defendant must demonstrate that the pri-
vate and public interests favor adjudication of the dispute in the
alternative forum.28 ' As in a transfer analysis, the private interest
factors include "the relative ease of access to sources of proof;"
the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of un-
willing witnesses, and the cost of obtaining the attendance of
willing witnesses; the possibility of a view of the premises, if ap-
propriate; and "all other practical problems that make trial of a
case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. '"284 The public interest
factors include "administrative difficulties flowing from court
congestion; the 'local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home;"' the interest in having a case tried in a forum
at home with the applicable law; "the avoidance of unnecessary
problems in conflict of laws; or in the application of foreign law,
and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum
with jury duty. 285
Foreign crash cases frequently present defendants with nu-
merous facts that weigh in favor of dismissal. The wreckage of
the aircraft, which is usually the most important piece of evi-
dence, is often kept in the country where the crash took place,
under the auspices of that country's authorities.286 Critical evi-
dence, eyewitnesses to the crash, and individuals familiar with
facts relating to the maintenance and history of the aircraft will
279 Id. at 1293.
280 Id. at 1294.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 1295.
283 Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001).
284 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (quoting Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
285 Id.
286 See Clerides v. Boeing Co., 534 F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2008); Melgares v.
Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 231, 242 (D. Conn. 2009).
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also frequently be located in the alternative forum.287 Documen-
tary evidence will also usually be located in the alternative fo-
rum, though if the aircraft was manufactured in the United
States, this may be balanced by evidence that the aircraft was
designed and manufactured in or near the forum state.2 8 How-
ever, a defendant's offer to make witnesses and evidence availa-
ble in the foreign forum will often alleviate the inconvenience
of transporting documents elsewhere. 2 9 The foreign state's in-
vestigative authorities may also lead or fully conduct the investi-
gation of the crash, ensuring that important evidence will be
located in the foreign forum; when this occurs, it demonstrates
and underscores that country's clear interest in any civil contro-
versy arising from the crash.290 A critical factor can also be a
defendant's inability to join parties essential to its defense of the
case in the United States, which goes to both convenience and
judicial economy, not to mention issues of fundamental
fairness. 291
Typically, in an international forum non conveniens case, pri-
vate and public interest factors are weighed between the state
where the case was brought and the foreign nation where the
crash took place. 29 2 Thus, while broader connections to the
United States such as regulatory concerns and the location of
manufacturers may be relevant, they are usually not as pertinent
287 See Fortaner v. Boeing Co., 504 Fed. App'x. 573, 581 (9th Cir. 2013); Mel-
gares, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 242-43.
288 See Lewis v. Lycoming, 917 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371-72 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding
location of wreckage in United States and manufacturing records in United
States to weigh against dismissal for forum non conveniens).
289 See Clerides, 534 F.3d at 629; Gambra v. Int'l Lease Fin. Corp., 377 F. Supp.
2d 810, 819 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Sun v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., No. 02 L 13640,
2004 WL 601953, at *1 (111. Cir. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004).
290 See Clerides, 534 F.3d at 630; Lueck, v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137,
1147 (9th Cir. 2001); Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 836 (5th
Cir. 1993); Melgares, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 249; Van Schijndel v. Boeing Co., 434 F.
Supp. 2d 766, 776-77, 784 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
291 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259 (1981); Dahl v. United
Techs. Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1031-33 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Air Crash Over Mid-
Ad. on June 1, 2009, 760 F. Supp. 2d 832, 846 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Melgares, 613 F.
Supp. 2d at 247; Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 806 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see
also supra Section II.B.3. (discussing plaintiffs' risk of not choosing a forum that
can hear claims against third party defendants).
292 See Dah4 632 F.2d at 1028 (comparing chosen forum of Delaware against
the crash site of Norway); accord Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377, 383-84
(5th Cir. 2002) (comparing chosen form of Texas against crash site of Mexico);
cf. Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 39 (3d Cir. 1988) (weighing interest
of Pennsylvania against crash site of British Columbia).
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as connections between the crash and the individual state.293
However, a recent forum non conveniens decision, Bochetto v.
Piper Aircraft Co., placed far greater emphasis on a case's connec-
tions with the United States as a whole.294 On its face, Bochetto is
very similar to the Supreme Court's decision in Reyno: an aircraft
manufactured in the United States was exported to Belgium and
was later taken to Portugal, where it subsequently crashed.295
The plaintiffs, survivors of the decedents, filed suit in a state
court in Pennsylvania, and several of the defendants moved to
dismiss in favor of Portugal on forum non conveniens grounds,
which the trial court granted.296 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court reversed the district court's dismissal for forum
non conveniens and remanded for further proceedings, criticiz-
ing the trial court's focus upon Pennsylvania and instructing
that it re-weigh the private and public interest factors as to the
case's network of connections to the United States as a whole,
not just Pennsylvania.297 In this respect, Bochetto is a significant
departure from the traditional approach courts take in weighing
the forum non conveniens factors.298 If upheld and followed,
Bochetto will make forum non conveniens dismissal in interna-
tional cases much more difficult, as nearly all cases involving
U.S.-made products have substantial connections to the broader
United States.
There are several other unique considerations that aviation
attorneys must consider in seeking forum non conveniens dis-
missal. Forum non conveniens differs from transfer, which sim-
ply changes the forum to another court within the same judicial
system, in that the lawsuit must actually be dismissed and re-filed
in another judicial system. 299 Because this frequently could
cause a new lawsuit to run afoul of a statute of limitations, or
293 See, e.g., Melgares, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 249, 252 (granting defendants' motion,
despite the fact that defendants' factories were located in the forum state).
294 Bochetto v. Piper Aircraft Co., 94 A.3d 1044, 1056 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
295 Id. at 1045.
296 Id. at 1046-47.
297 Id. at 1054-56.
298 See Windt v. Quest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2008)
(rejecting the argument that the forum non conveniens inquiry looks to the con-
nections to the United States rather than the state where the court is located);
Torreblanca de Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 806 F. Supp. 139, 144 (E.D. Tex. 1992)
("The fact that some evidence concerning the aircraft's design and manufacture
may be located elsewhere in the United States does not make the Eastern District
of Texas a convenient forum.").
299 See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1955).
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force parties into courts where the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion is questionable, courts will often condition a forum non
conveniens dismissal upon the defendant's waiver of the de-
fenses of limitations or personal jurisdiction.0 0 Defendants seek-
ing to use this defense would be wise to notify their co-
defendants of their planned course of action and obtain their
consent or cooperation. Plaintiffs will often join local defend-
ants for other venue purposes and reach an understanding with
them to cooperate in venue matters. 10' A co-defendant's refusal
to cooperate can quickly undermine a forum non conveniens
dismissal. °2
Finally, when a case is pending in state court, defendants
should be aware of any statutory standards or limitations regard-
ing the state's forum non conveniens doctrine. While some
states, like the federal courts, have adapted forum non con-
veniens from the common law, other states have codified the
doctrine with different requirements and standards, or their
courts have developed standards that deviate from federal
law. 0 Some states, such as Texas and Illinois, have imple-
mented time limits for moving to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens. °4 Others, such as Florida, require that all defendants
stipulate to certain conditions, such as a waiver of limitations,
for the motion to be granted, and impose time limits on the
dismissed plaintiff to re-file the case.3 05
300 Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 605 (10th Cir. 1998); Gam-
bra v. Int'l Lease Fin. Corp., 377 F. Supp. 2d 810, 827-28 (C.D. Cal. 2005);
Zermeno v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 646, 658-59 (S.D. Tex.
2003).
301 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3807
(4th ed. 2014).
302 See Zermeno, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
303 See, e.g., Mar-Land Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Ref.,
L.P., 777 A.2d 774, 778 (Del. 2001) (under Delaware law, a case may only be
dismissed for forum non conveniens if litigation in Delaware would impose an
"overwhelming hardship" upon the defendant). But see Kinney Sys., Inc. v. Cont'l
Ins. Co., 674 So.2d 86, 93 (Fla. 1996) (adopting the federal doctrine of forum
non conveniens).
304 ILL. S. CT. R. 187(a) (requiring a motion to dismiss for forum non con-
veniens to be filed within ninety days after the last day allowed for the filing of
the moving party's answer); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(d) (West
2008) (requiring the motion to be filed no later than 180 days after the time
required for filing a motion to transfer venue).
305 FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.061 (b-h).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The forum where the crash site is located is by no means the
one in which an aviation case must be litigated. A creative plain-
tiff's lawyer will discover a number of potentially viable forums,
and must then engage in the arduous task of deciding which is
the most favorable. Conversely, skilled defense attorneys have a
number of tools at their disposal in their attempt to get the case
out of the plaintiff's chosen forum and into one that is more
favorable-or at a minimum, convince a court to apply the law
of a more favorable jurisdiction, regardless of which forum the
case is actually litigated in. Counsel for both sides must be fully
prepared for this inevitable battle, as winning or losing the law-
suit might just depend upon where the case lands after the
crash.
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